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U.S. TAX LAWS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT
FROM LATIN AMERICA
CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most countries of Latin America attempt to tax only income
deemed to have its source within their boundaries; they do not at-
tempt to tax income of their residents (or citizens) deemed to orig-
inate in the rest of the world. These countries employ a territorial
or source-based system of taxation, and do not try to implement
worldwide or residence-based taxation.' To the extent that resi-
dents of nations relying on source-based taxation invest their capi-
tal abroad, they can avoid taxation at home. Moreover, when Latin
American nations attempt to implement worldwide taxation, they
meet with little administrative success. Taxpayers in most Latin
American countries that do employ the worldwide principle are
generally able to evade tax on foreign-source income by commit-
* The author is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. From
1983 to 1985 he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Analysis of the U.S. Treasury
Department. In that capacity he had primary responsibility for development of Tax Reform
for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, the tax reform proposals submitted to
President Reagan by the Treasury Department in November 1984 which became the basis
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. He has participated in missions to examine the tax systems
of Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Turkey, and Venezuela, and has directed a study of the
taxation of income from business and capital for the Government of Colombia.
This paper was initially prepared under contract for the Inter-American Development
Bank. Though the author wishes to thank Richard Bird, David Rosenbloom, Wayne Thirsk,
Miguel Urrutia, and George Zodrow for useful comments on a previous draft of this paper,
the views expressed here are entirely his own.
1. For a list of Latin American countries which rely on source-based and residence-
based taxation, see Appendix. Ten of the 17 countries that tax the income of individuals
employ the territorial principle; only seven attempt to tax the worldwide income of individ-
uals, and Uruguay has no individual income tax. In corporate taxation, reliance on the terri-
torial principle is even more dominant, with 13 of the 18 that tax corporate income employ-
ing the territorial principle. In this paper no distinction is made between residence and
citizenship as the basis for worldwide taxation of individuals. Although important, the dis-
tinction is secondary for the purpose at hand. Similarly, little attention will be paid to the
important question of how source-based taxation of business income is implemented (e.g.,
via separate accounting based on arm's length prices or via formula apportionment) or to
the difficulties inherent in implementation. While these issues are crucial in the taxation of
income from a trade or business, they are not of great import in the taxation of income from
passive investments.
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ting fraud, with relative impunity.
The direct result of the failure or inability of such countries to
tax foreign-source income is loss of tax revenues. These countries
also suffer a loss of capital otherwise available for productive in-
vestment at home and, implicitly, a further diminution of their tax
base.'
This article examines the inducements to capital flight' pro-
duced by the interplay among the tax laws of the United States
and those of the countries of Latin America. Generally, United
States domestic tax policies exacerbate the problem of capital
flight from Latin America. Opportunities to channel investments
through tax haven countries" with which the United States has tax
treaties5 complicates this interplay, although the United States has
moved in recent years to reduce the opportunities to use "treaty
shopping" to reduce taxes.
The primary issue for examination is tax treatment of income
earned by foreigners on passive investments6 in the United States,
as non-business income" appears to be the form in which income is
most likely to be earned by Latin Americans wishing to invest in
the United States without leaving their home countries.
The United States does not tax most capital gains8 realized9
2. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN
AMERICA 408 (1986).
3. The term "capital flight" is used in this article as a short-hand reference to describe
the investment abroad of capital owned by Latin Americans. While it is assumed that such
capital may be highly mobile, there is no suggestion that such funds are necessarily "hot" or
"flight capital" leaving because of political instability or economic uncertainty.
4. A tax haven may be described broadly as a place where foreigners may receive in-
come or own assets without paying high rates of tax upon them. A tax haven may be estab-
lished inadvertently by adherence to a strict territoriality principle of income taxation, de
Jantscher, Tax Havens Explained, 13 FIN. & DEv. 31 (1976).
5. For a list of countries, some of which may operate as tax havens, with which the U.S.
has tax treaties, see the table following 26 U.S.C.A. § 861 (West 1982). See also CUMULATIVE
INDEX TO INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL NATIONS 73-77 (W. Diamond & D. Diamond
eds. 1988). C.f. Shoup, Effects of U.S. Tax Laws on the Tax Systems of Developing Coun-
tries, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 181, 184-203 (R. Hellawell ed.
1980) (discussing characteristics of tax haven jurisdictions).
6. I.R.C. § 469(c) (Passive activity losses and credits limited - Passive activity
defined).
7. "To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are 'carrying on a business' re-
quires an examination of the facts in each case." Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 217
(1940). See generally Garelik, What Constitutes Doing Business Within the United States
by a Non-Resident Alien Individual or a Foreign Corporation, 18 TAX L. REV. 423 (1963).
8. Capital gains are gains from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. I.R.C. § 1222.
Generally, all assets are capital assets except those specifically excluded in I.R.C. § 1221.
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by foreigners, 0 except those from real estate and those effectively
connected with a trade or business. Most interest income paid to
unrelated foreigners1 is exempt from U.S. tax, whether paid by
financial institutions or by others. Dividends on corporate shares
and capital gains on real estate are generally subject to tax; how-
ever, in the case of dividends it may be possible to reduce taxes
substantially through the use of nominee accounts located in treaty
partners of the United States. Thus, the United States acts as an
enormous magnet poised to attract capital, especially debt funds,
from Latin America.
The article illustrates how problems of capital flight and tax
avoidance and evasion created by U.S. tax law are further aggra-
vated by the typical tax treatment of capital income in Latin
American countries. The discussion of tax systems employed in
Latin America will be brief. It is difficult to go beyond the basic
characterization of a system as being based on either source or res-
idence without becoming embroiled in minute details. More impor-
tant, little would be gained from a detailed examination of the tax
laws of Latin American countries. A basic premise of this paper is
that every tax system in Latin America is likely to resemble a
source-based system, especially in its taxation of passive income,
even if the tax law states that worldwide income is to be taxed.
The discussion that follows is not based on a naive view that
taxes are the only determinant of international capital flows, or
even that taxes are the most important determinant. Political in-
stability and fear of economic crises and currency fluctuations pro-
vide much more important reasons for capital flight from develop-
ing countries. Similarly, any tax advantages of investment in the
United States are likely to be dwarfed by the attraction of political
Major categories of non-capital assets include property held for resale in the normal course
of business, i.e., inventory, trade accounts and notes receivables, depreciable property, and
real estate used in a trade or business.
9. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (determination of amount of and recognition of gain and loss).
10. "Foreigner" for purposes of this paper refers to natural and juridical persons who
are non-residents of the United States for tax purposes. Resident status is determined ac-
cording to Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b). See Adams v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 252 (1966); Begassiere v.
Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1031 (1959) affd per curiam, 272 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1959); Herbert G.
Whyte, Tax Ct. Mem. Dec (P-H) Para. 86,486 at 2213-14 (1986); Park v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.
252, 286-98 (1982) aff'd without opinion 755 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
11. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(1)(B) (effectively connected income); an unrelated foreigner is a
nonresident person not engaged in a trade or business and whose income during a taxable




stability. The tax treatment of various items of U.S. source income
in the United States and elsewhere, however, does exert an influ-
ence on investment decisions.
No attempt is made here to quantify the proportion of capital
drawn into the United States by tax benefits, relative political sta-
bility, or any other attraction; that would be a hopeless task, espe-
cially as the difficulty in holding all other influences constant is
compounded by the lack of reliable data. Instead, this article fo-
cuses on U.S. tax policy and the ways in which it attracts capital.
No effort is made to provide a comparison of U.S. tax law with
that of other countries. To the extent that foreign investors are
treated generously elsewhere, comparably generous U.S. treatment
may merely divert investment from these developed countries to
the United States, rather than inducing additional capital flows
from Latin America. If generous taxation of the income of foreign-
ers continues elsewhere, not much may be gained for Latin Ameri-
can countries from a unilateral tightening of U.S. taxation of such
income.
II. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
There are two basic approaches to the taxation of income flow-
ing between countries. Under the source principle, all income
originating in a given jurisdiction is taxed, but income originating
elsewhere is not. This is also called the territorial approach.12 The
residence principle, or worldwide approach, in contrast, focuses on
the residence of the taxpayer, and taxes all income of the resident
wherever earned.13 Many countries, including the United States,
employ both approaches. That is, they tax both income originating
within their borders as well as all the income of residents, wherever
earned.
Advocates of the residence principle cite the following primary
advantages. First, residence-based taxation does not discriminate
between income flows, which vary depending on country of source.
Income is taxed in the same manner, whether earned in the United
States or in any foreign country. This feature of residence-based
taxation is sometimes called "capital-export neutrality." If em-
ployed effectively by all nations, residence-based taxation would
12. For a discussion of territorial or source-based taxation, see Shoup, supra note 5, at
194-95.
13. For a discussion of the worldwide or source-based system of taxation see id.
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not interfere with the allocation of economic resources among na-
tions; in principle, it would lead to allocation of the world's capital
to its most productive use. By comparison, source-based taxation
discourages investment in high-tax jurisdictions and encourages in-
vestment in low-tax jurisdictions.14 Capital-exporting countries
support residence-based taxation because they want to keep the
revenue generated by the foreign investment of their residents.'
Advocates of source-based taxation argue, in part, that the
source country is entitled to capture for its public coffers part of
the income originating within its borders.' 6 Moreover, residence-
based taxation is inevitably difficult to administer, especially in a
developing country." To the extent that residence-based taxation
cannot be administered effectively, capital flight is likely from the
countries with inadequate administration; thus, the theoretical ad-
vantages of capital-export neutrality are not actually achieved. 8
Double taxation results from the application of both source
and residence-based taxation to a particular international flow of
income. Countries employing the residence principle commonly de-
fer to the fiscal claims of source countries. In the United States
this is achieved unilaterally by allowing credit against U.S. tax lia-
bility up to the average rate of taxation paid in the United States
14. Of course, if source-based taxes exactly reflect benefits of public spending, no dis-
tortions will occur. Indeed, if public spending provides substantial benefits for business, the
failure to levy taxes that reflect such benefits would cause distortions. This qualification is
ignored herein, since (at the margin) the direct link between benefits received and taxes
paid by corporations and high-income individuals is generally quite weak.
15. For an interpretation along these lines, see Kingson, The Coherence of Interna-
tional Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1163-66 (1981).
16. For a strong argument based on "entitlement," see Musgrave, Interjurisdictional
Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income, in TAX COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY at 197-225 (S. Cnossen ed. 1987)[hereinafter Interjurisdictional Coordination]; P.
MUSGRAVE, COORDINATION OP TAXES ON CAPITAL INCOME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1987);
UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES (1980).
17. If implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, source-based taxation yields "capi-
tal-import neutrality," since all taxpayers operating in a given country pay the taxes of that
country, rather than the potentially different taxes of their home countries. Though this
notion of a "level playing field" in the capital-importing country has intuitive appeal, it has
no resource allocation advantages. P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT INCOME 119-21 (1969). Source-based taxation, if universally applied, would result
in tax-inducements for investment in low tax countries, rather than having no effect on
investment decisions.
18. "Though administratively difficult to achieve, a key requirement of the latter aspect
(avoidance of capital flight) is to apply global income taxes, corporate and individual." P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 16. An important point of this article is that this (implementation of
worldwide taxation) is a hopeless goal.
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for income taxes paid to foreign governments.19 As long as the for-
eign tax rate does not exceed the domestic tax rate, capital-export
neutrality is achieved. As an alternative, a taxpayer can opt to take
a deduction for foreign taxes, rather than a credit.20 United States
tax treaties also regulate the tax treatment of income flowing be-
tween treaty partners.2 1
Nations face conflicting objectives in deciding whether to util-
ize source or residence-based taxation, as well as whether to give
precedence in international tax conventions to the tax system of
the source or residence nation. For example, a capital-importing
nation might like to enact heavy source-based taxes in order to
capture tax revenue for its treasury. On the other hand, it may fear
the adverse effects source-based taxation that is not offset by for-
eign tax credits in capital-exporting countries would have on for-
eign investment in the country. Indeed, a decision may be made by
the source country to forego tax revenues in order to attract capi-
tal. This is especially likely where potential foreign investors reside
in countries that do not or cannot tax foreign-source income. Capi-
tal-exporting22 countries can be expected to prefer residence-based
taxation. This pattern is exemplified in the tax laws of the United
States, and sometimes to a lesser degree in those of other devel-
oped countries. Although the United States unilaterally extends
priority in taxation to the source country through its foreign tax
credit, 3 it also attempts to protect its revenue position as a capital
exporter by pressing for provisions in its foreign tax treaties that
reduce source-country taxation of interest, dividends, and various
19. In the case of income earned abroad by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational
corporations, tax is levied (and credit is allowed for foreign taxes) only when income is repa-
triated. See I.R.C. § 881 (tax on income of foreign corporations not connected with United
States business). Sections 951-961, dealing with controlled foreign corporations, would not
apply in this case. As long as U.S. taxes are deferred in this way, taxation is based on source,
rather than on residence, and capital-export neutrality does not prevail. For a discussion of
capital-export neutrality, see supra text accompanying note 13.
20. Allowing a deduction for foreign taxes, rather than a credit, leads to the maximiza-
tion of national welfare in the capital-exporting country, since the net-of-tax return in the
source country will be equal to the gross-of-tax return in the home country. See Hufbauer,
A Guide to Law and Policy, in G. HUFBAUER, W. SCHMIDT, N. TURE, 0. BROWNLEE & D.
SMITH, U.S. TAXATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD at 1, 1-6 (1975).
21. Treaties traditionally have distinguished between primary income on real invest-
ments and secondary income on financial assets; the former are taxed at source while the
latter are taxed at residence. See generally P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 16.
22. U.S. assets abroad in 1985 amounted to $949.4 billion, up from $719.8 billion in
1981. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITD STATES: 1988 758
(108th ed.).
23. Foreign tax credit is dealt with by I.R.C. §§ 27, 901-908.
[Vol. 20:2
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other forms of payments to its residents. Capital-importing coun-
tries favor relatively high source-based taxes on repatriated income
for which capital-exporting countries provide foreign tax credits. In
the event that the tax rates applied to these forms of income by
the source country fall short of rates in countries of residence
which allow foreign tax credits, source countries can raise revenues
without fear of adverse economic consequences.2 4
The conflict among these objectives is illustrated by compar-
ing the relevant provisions of the United Nations Model Double
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Coun-
tries 5 with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and on
Capital.2 The OECD convention primarily concerns fiscal relations
between developed countries. Because capital flows among devel-
oped countries can be expected to be roughly in balance over the
long run, the distinction between capital-importing and capital-ex-
porting countries may have little significance. Thus, the OECD
draft treaty, reflecting the preference of these countries for the res-
idence principle, calls for limiting withholding taxes on interest to
ten percent of the gross amount of interest.
By comparison, the U.N. Model Convention involves both de-
veloping countries (generally capital importers) and developed
ones (generally capital exporters).2 7 It leaves the tax rate on inter-
est unstated, subject to bilateral negotiations between the con-
tracting parties.28 This difference reflects the conflict between the
"strong feeling on the part of members from developing countries
that those countries should have the exclusive, or at least the pri-
mary, right to tax interest"29 and the view of the representatives of
24. If the source country's tax rate is lower than that of the taxpayer's resident country,
the taxpayer can apply a dollar-for-dollar credit against his tax liability in the residence
jurisdiction. The taxpayer will not have a greater total tax burden as a result of being an
investor in the source country, and thus no objection to being subject to source country
taxation. Thus, a capital-importing country (source country) can raise revenues without con-
troversy or fear of repelling foreign investment by taxing source income up to the rate pro-
vided for by the residence country's foreign tax credit.
25. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Devel-
oping Countries, U.N. Doc. No. ST/ESA/102; U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3. (1980) [hereinafter
U.N. Model Convention].
26. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Draft Double Taxation
Convention on Income and on Capital, July 30, 1963, OECD Fiscal Committee, 1963 Draft
Convention.
27. Presently, no countries have adopted the U.N. Model Convention.
28. U.N. Model Convention, supra note 25, at art. 11, para. 2.
29. Id. at 123 (commentary accompanying U.N. Model Convention).
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developed countries that the home country of investors should
have the primary or even exclusive right to tax such income.30 A
similar ambiguity and latitude for negotiations characterizes the
U.N. guidelines on withholding rates on dividends, in contrast to
the definite limits stated in the OECD model convention.
Foreign tax treaties of the United States commonly give the
country of residence an increased secondary claim in the taxation
of certain types of income (e.g., interest, dividends, and capital
gains) by providing reduced taxation by the source country. While
such treaties provide for the capture of tax revenues on income
from U.S. capital invested abroad and encourage capital flows be-
tween treaty partners and the United States, they are subject to
abuse. The most common forms of abuse are described in section
IV herein. Moreover, for certain types of income earned in the
United States by foreigners, the United States does not attempt to
impose source-based taxation as a matter of domestic tax policy.31
III. LATIN AMERICAN PRACTICE
Most Latin American countries attempt to tax income from
business and capital earned within their borders by both residents
and non-residents.32 Tax rates applied to individual income range
from 30 percent in Bolivia, Colombia, and Paraguay, to 55 percent
and above in Chile, the Dominican Republic (70%), El Salvador
(60%), Mexico (60.5%), Nicaragua (55%)y, and Panama (56%).
Corporate rates are generally similar, but commonly somewhat
lower.33 Unless income earned abroad by residents is also taxed,
either by the home country or by the country in which capital is
invested, there are tax-induced incentives for capital flight.
30. Id. at 121-37 (commentary discussing interest), 109-21 (commentary discussing
dividends).
31. The United States sacrifices the opportunity to tax income derived from foreign
capital invested in the United States, conceivably, to obtain long-term benefits of increased
capital investment.
32. Since the primary focus of this paper is on the U.S. tax treatment of income earned
by residents of Latin American countries, no attempt is made to survey the tax treatment of
income from business and capital in Latin America in detail. Also beyond the scope of this
paper are the "quasi-taxes" (ceilings on interest rates and rent controls) and "quasi-subsi-
dies" (protective tariffs and import quotas) that either reduce or increase the attraction of
investment in Latin America. See also McLure, Fiscal Policy and Equity in Developing
Countries, in POLICY REFORM AND EQUITY, at 13-42 (E. Berg ed. 1988).
33. Venezuela is an exception to this rule with a corporate tax rate of 50% and an
individual tax rate of 45%. See further Appendix.
[Vol. 20:2
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The countries of Latin America have traditionally been strong
proponents of the source principle of taxation."4 This is reflected in
the pattern of jurisdictional standards.3 5 Only five of eighteen re-
porting countries attempt to tax the worldwide income of corpora-
tions, and only seven do so for individuals. Although several of the
more developed Latin American countries, such as Brazil (for indi-
viduals only), Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, do attempt to tax on a
worldwide basis, several others, such as Argentina and Venezuela
do not. In addition, several of the countries attempting worldwide
taxation are relatively undeveloped, such as El Salvador (for indi-
viduals only), Honduras, and Peru. With few exceptions," the
countries that follow the worldwide approach allow foreign tax
credit for taxes paid to source countries. With the exception of Ar-
gentina and Brazil, Latin American countries are partners to few
tax treaties.37 No Latin American country has a ratified, effective
foreign tax treaty with the United States.
The figures in the Appendix almost certainly overstate effec-
tive reliance on residence-based taxation. Major domestic Latin
American corporations operating abroad, whether through subsidi-
aries or branches, can be expected to report income to their home
countries, though perhaps not with complete accuracy.3 8 The accu-
34. For a strong statement along these lines, see Atchabahian, The Andean Subregion
and its Approach to Avoidance or Alleviation of International Double Taxation, in A.
ATCHABAHAIN, R. VALD.S COSTA, E. RICHARD, F. GENDRE, J. HAUSMAN & P. SIBILLE, FIscAL
HARMONIZATION IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES at 7, 28-31 (1975). According to Decision 40
under the Treaty of Cartegena establishing the Andean Group, interest and dividends
should be taxed only on the basis of source. See also Agreement on Andean Subregional
Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
35. See Appendix.
36. Brazil, for example, allows credit only as permitted by treaty.
37. This does not include the tax provisions of the Andean Pact among Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 34.
38. The combination of source-based taxation in the Latin American country and the
exemption of interest income paid to foreigners in the United States provides an open door
to a particularly egregious form of tax avoidance. Suppose that a Latin American business-
man owns a company operating in his country of residence. If he makes an equity invest-
ment in his business, the resulting income is ordinarily subject to tax at least once (if in-
vested in a partnership, a proprietorship, or a corporation in a country with generous
provisions for the integration of the corporation and individual income taxes); if the invest-
ment is made in a corporation in a country that allows no integration, the income may be
subject to double taxation, once at the corporate level and again when distributed to the
businessman-shareholder.
A potentially more attractive arrangement from the standpoint of minimizing taxes
would be to make a loan to the business. Depending on whether the corporation or the
individual was subject to the higher marginal tax rate, the net result might be either a net
increase or decrease in aggregate taxation of the corporation and its owner. In any event, the
1989]
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racy of reporting is likely to depend on the existence and effective-
ness of exchange controls, on the availability of (and limitations
on) the foreign tax credit in the home country as an inducement to
honest reporting, on the extent of exchange of information be-
tween fiscal authorities of the source country and the home coun-
try, and on the feasibility of structuring parent-subsidiary rela-
tionss" in such a way as to circumvent such exchanges of
information and other administrative controls of the home coun-
try. Because income from the conduct of a trade or business in the
United States is subject to taxation, even if earned by a foreign
person, it is not the primary vehicle of tax-induced capital flight to
the United States from Latin America. 0
situation would be preferable to an equity investment in a country that provides no relief
from double taxation of dividends, unless the interest payments were construed to be divi-
dends and therefore subject to the tax treatment described above.
Preferable to either of these two investment strategies would be an arrangement under
which the Latin American businessman would make a deposit in a U.S. bank with the un-
derstanding that the funds would be lent again to his firm operating in his home country.
Under U.S. law no tax would be paid on interest paid on the deposit; by comparison, a
deduction generally would be allowed by the home country for interest paid to the U.S.
bank. There might be a withholding tax on such interest, but ordinarily at a rate below that
at which the deduction is taken. Under source-based taxation no tax would be due the home
country on the interest earned on the U.S. bank account. (Even under a residence-based
system it would be difficult to tax such income.) Of course, there would be some spread
between the interest rate charged by the bank on the loan and that paid on the deposit. But
even this is likely to be small, especially since the amount deposited could be held as collat-
eral for the loan. In any event, the spread is likely to be substantially less than the tax
saving resulting from the interest deduction. If so, this "tax arbitrage" operation results in a
net tax saving.
An even simpler approach is possible in countries that allow deduction for interest paid
on bearer debt, with no withholding on interest paid domestically. The company borrows
from its owner, issuing bearer debt. Interest payments are deductible to the business, but
not taxable to the owner. Of course, this outrageous form of abuse could be substantially
curtailed by the elimination of bearer debt, particularly if accompanied by substantial with-
holding taxes on interest payments.
To the extent that interest rates in the Latin American country include an inflation
premium that is allowed as a deduction, this result is magnified. If the inflation rate is low
or if a deduction is allowed only for the real component of interest expense (nominal rate
less the inflation premium), the incentives to structure financing in this manner are dimin-
ished; but even in in the event of low inflation or a real interest rate provision, this approach
is preferable to either direct equity investment or the form of simple debt investment con-
sidered above.
39. For a discussion of transfer pricing, see Wheeler, An Academic Looks at Transfer
Pricing in a Global Economy, 40 TAx NoTES 87 (1988). See also Hendrix, A Review of
Argentine and Ecuadorian Tax Law Regarding Transfer Pricing and Recommendations for
Improving Ecuador's Approach, 20 U. MIAMI INMTR-AM. L. REv 283 (1989).
40. In 1981, revenues from taxation of income effectively connected with a trade or
business of a foreign person yielded only $260 million; the yield was $268 million in 1982. By
comparison, withholding taxes on income of foreign persons not effectively connected with a
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Tax-induced capital flight involves investment in assets and
instruments, the gain or income on which foreigners are not taxed
by the United States. Interest-bearing securities, bank accounts,
corporate shares, and real estate in the United States typify these
investments. The United States does not tax most interest paid to
unrelated foreigners; 1 and capital gains realized by foreigners on
assets other than real estate are exempt from U.S. tax."2 It also
may be possible to reduce substantially U.S. taxes on corporate
dividends (and with greater risk and less flexibility than those on
capital gains on real estate). The next section contains a discussion
of provisions of U.S. law dealing with these types of income.
Can a Latin American country that attempts to impose taxa-
tion on a worldwide basis do so effectively with regard to these
types of passive investment income? A negative answer is virtually
inevitable. Ordinarily, passive income earned abroad, i.e., in the
United States, on which neither foreign nor domestic tax was paid
will not be repatriated through legal channels. Moreover, since no
country in Latin America which employs the worldwide approach
has a double taxation treaty with the United States, the exchange
of tax information with the United States is nonexistent. 43 In the
case of bank interest, even the exchange of information does not
help. Because financial institutions are not required to report in-
terest payments to foreign investors to the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service, an exchange of information agreement would serve little
purpose; under U.S. law there would be no information to
exchange.4
trade or business were almost $830 million in 1981. Much of the latter revenue was collected
from reduced rates on payments to treaty countries, and other similar income was com-
pletely untaxed. Dale, Effectively Connected Income, 42 TAx L. REv. 689, 695 (1987).
41. For a definition of unrelated foreigner, see supra note. 11.
42. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) deals with taxation of nonresident alien individuals.
43. Even if there were such a treaty, it would be simple and relatively safe to give the
bank or other payor of interest a false address of convenience, for example, in another Latin
American country that employs the territorial system or in a tax haven country with which
the U.S. has a tax treaty.
44. Given the difficulties the United States has in preventing its own citizens from
evading taxes on U.S. source interest and dividend income, there is little reason to believe
that any Latin American country can effectively apply a worldwide system of taxation to
non-business income earned in the United States by its residents, either with or without
cooperation from the United States. There is little such cooperation now, under current U.S.
law and in the absence of treaties.
1989]
332 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:2
IV. U.S. LAW: PRINCIPLES AND FACTS
The United States has a tradition of strongly advocating resi-
dence-based taxation. While it applies source-based taxation to in-
come originating within the country, it also taxes the foreign in-
come of U.S. persons. 45 But much income from capital originating
in the United States is legally exempt from tax if earned by for-
eigners, 46 and much is taxed at low rates, channelled through
treaty partners of the United States.
A. Income from a Trade or Business
Income received by foreigners from the conduct of a trade or
business in the United States has long been subject to U.S. taxa-
tion. The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 (FITA)47 made two
important changes that restrict the scope of taxation in this area.
These changes operate to encourage capital flight from other coun-
tries to the United States. Today, investment income 4  received by
foreigners also engaged in business in the United States is included
in taxable income from the conduct of a trade or business only if
"effectively connected" 9 with such a trade or business. 50 Prior law,
45. This includes, for example, income earned in a trade or business, interest paid to
affiliates, and capital gains on real estate. Determination of sources of income is governed by
I.R.C. §§ 861-865.
46. Nowhere is the policy explicitly stated that only U.S. source income of foreign per-
sons, as opposed to their total worldwide income, is subject to tax. For a discussion of the
history of U.S. law regarding taxation of income earned by foreign persons, see Choate,
Hurok & Klein, Federal Tax Policy for Foreign Income and Foreign Taxpayers - History,
Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 441 (1971).
47. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1541 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
48. "Fixed or determinable annual or periodic" (FDAP) income refers to amounts re-
ceived by nonresident alien individuals as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, certain
gains, and sale or exchange of original issue discount obligations under I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)
and § 881(a). This income is considered FDAP only to the extent that it is not effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. See Treas. Regs. 99
1.871-7(b), 1.1441-2(a).
49. I.R.C. § 864(c)(4) defines "effectively connected income." See Tress. Regs. §§ 1.864-
3, 1.864-5, 1.864-7. For an excellent discussion of the subject, see Dale, supra note 40.
50. For a technical discussion of the Act, see S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, FOREIGN INVES-
TORS TAX AcT. SUPPLEMENT TO U.S. INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND NON-
RESIDENT ALIENS (1967). The exclusion of most such income from tax when received by for-
eigners is consistent with the policy and history of FITA, suggesting that its goal was to free
investment income from U.S. tax. See generally Dale, supra note 40. For a more detailed
discussion of prior law and the reasons for the adoption of FITA, see Ross, United States
Taxation of Aliens and Foreign Corporations: The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1969 and
Related Developments, 22 TAX L. REV. 279 (1967).
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relying on the "force of attraction" 51 doctrine, automatically in-
cluded investment income earned by a foreign corporation or indi-
vidual in the taxable income of that trade or business.
This distinction in categorization is important. Before the en-
actment of FITA, investment income was taxed at a fixed rate,
commonly thirty percent of the gross amount, unless reduced by
treaty. By comparison, income deemed to be derived from pursuit
of a trade or business, including that drawn by the force of attrac-
tion, was subject to progressive rates as high as seventy percent,
albeit on net income (after deductions).2
FITA also clarified that the holding of securities for invest-
ment purposes did not constitute a trade or business, even if a
United States resident agent was granted authority to use discre-
tion in managing a portfolio. Together, these provisions substan-
tially reduced the likelihood that investment income would be sub-
ject to taxation as income from a trade or business." The effect of
To determine whether such items of income are effectively connected, two tests, the
"asset test" and the "business activities test" are applied. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(2). The tests
are discussed further in Dale, supra note 40.
51. The "force of attraction" system has been described as a net which captured all
U.S.-source income regardless of its relationship to the U.S. business being conducted by the
foreign person. For a discussion of the doctrine, its effects and the reasons Congress aban-
doned it, see Dale, supra note 40, at 690-93.
52. Foreign taxpayers have been allowed to elect to treat certain income from U.S. real
estate as effectively connected income, in order to avoid having the gross amount of rental
income received by the foreign person taxed at a flat rate of (usually) 30 percent.
Despite its apparent attraction, this election would often have undesirable tax conse-
quences. Since it cannot be revoked without the approval of the IRS, it applies to gains on
sale of real estate; in contrast, it was often possible to avoid tax on such gains if no election
were made. Because the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA)
makes virtually all income from sales of U.S. real estate by foreign persons result in effec-
tively connected income, this election has become more attractive.
53. FITA tightened tax provisions for business income, as well as loosened them for
investment income. It did this by including certain types of foreign-source income within
the "effectively connected" net. This provision was justified in part to prevent "the use of
the United States as a tax haven." The following is an example of the type of abuse ad-
dressed by this provision. A foreign corporation operating through a sales office in the
United States would have only foreign-source income, provided title to goods passed outside
the country. Rather than modifying the defective source rules (a change made in the 1986
Tax Reform Act), FITA attacked this abuse by considering income of the type described to
be effectively connected with the U.S. trade or business. See also R. DALE, THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 716 (1986). According to Dale,
ECI (effectively connected income) rules are a substitute for the prior indiscrim-
inate but jurisdictionally-limited monopole magnet. Instead they create a more
subtle but more powerful bipolar magnet, which repels from the net progressive
rate regime some types of previously-attracted U.S.-source income, but attracts
to it certain foreign-source income which was previously beyond its force field.
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these provisions has assumed even greater significance with the in-
creased use of treaty shopping and the repeal of the thirty percent
withholding tax on portfolio interest. 4
FITA was passed in response to concern about the balance of
payments problems experienced by the United States in the early
1960s.1 Its purpose - to attract foreign capital into the United
States - was made explicit in the report of a task force appointed
by President Kennedy in 1963.1" The task force report stated that:
"[rievision of U.S. taxation for foreign investors is one of the most
immediate and productive ways to increase the flow of foreign cap-
ital to this country." With this purpose in mind, it recommended
"that a nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or business
within the United States be taxed at regular rates only on income
connected with such trade or business. ' 57
B. Bank Interest
Interest on bank accounts paid to foreigners has long been ex-
empt from U.S. taxation. 58 This exemption is a response to com-
petitive pressures from abroad; it is argued that without such an
exemption, U.S. banks would be unable to compete for funds in
international capital markets.5
Id. at 692.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 closed several loopholes that could formerly be used to
avoid paying U.S. income tax on the disposition of business assets. Under prior law it was
possible either to sell business assets under the installment method, receiving the proceeds
after termination of engagement in a U.S. trade or business, or to cease operating in one
year and sell the assets in the next, when the taxpayer would no longer be engaged in a U.S.
trade or business. The 1986 Act eliminates these techniques. Moreover, under prior law a
foreign shareholder could liquidate a U.S. corporation (other than a real property holding
corporation) without paying U.S. tax, since capital gains realized by foreign persons are ex-
empt from U.S. tax. Under the new law a provision of general applicability (repeal of the
General Utilities Doctrine) subjects all gains on corporate assets realized through liquida-
tion to corporate tax.
54. See I.R.C. § 1441 (withholding tax on nonresident aliens); I.R.C. § 1442 (withhold-
ing tax on foreign corporations). See also Granwell, Repeal of the 30 Percent Withholding
Tax on Interest Paid to Foreigners, TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 306, 387 (1984).
55. For a discussion of the legislative history of the repeal of 30% withholding tax on
portfolio interest, see Granwell, supra note 54, at 387 n.14 (1984).
56. The Fowler Task Force Report, H.R. REP. No. 13103, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967)
was transmitted to President Johnson in April 1964.
57. See Dale, supra note 40, at 691.
58. I.R.C. § 861(a)(1), in conjunction with § 861(c), treats interest on deposits in the
U.S. held by nonresident aliens as if it were of a foreign source if it is not effectively con-
nected with a U.S. business.
59. Until 1976, this feature of the United States Internal Revenue Code had been ex-
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United States financial institutions which pay interest to for-
eign recipients are not obligated to report such payments to the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Some U.S. residents probably use
this exemption, as well as that for interest on debt securities and
the reduced rates provided by treaties, to avoid U.S. taxes. It is
important to note the administrative difficulties the United States
has encountered because they indicate the obstacles likely to be
encountered by Latin American countries which seek to tax these
types of U.S.-source income.
C. Portfolio Interest
Until 1984, interest on portfolio income"0 from debt securities
issued in the United States was subject to a thirty percent with-
holding tax, or a lower rate if provided by treaty. Commonly, a
U.S. corporation avoided this tax by using a finance subsidiary"1
incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles.2
The following is a simple example of this type of abuse of the
treaty process. The finance subsidiary of a U.S. corporation
chartered in the Netherlands Antilles would float a public issue in
the Euro-dollar bond market s and loan the proceeds to its U.S.
tended repeatedly for three- or four-year periods on a "temporary" basis. In the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, the tax-free treatment of interest received by foreigners from financial institu-
tions was made permanent. See Karzon, International Tax Evasion: Spawned in the
United States and Nurtured by Secrecy Haven, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 757, 764 (1983).
The rationale offered for the permanent status of the exemption was that "[t]oo many
Americans are unemployed due to a lack of capital growth through sufficient investments.
The Senate Finance Committee bill [for a permanent exemption] will motivate greater capi-
tal flow to this country and will subsequently benefit all Americans." Id. at 765. The House
Ways and Means Committee voted to eliminate the 30% withholding tax on portfolio in-
come paid to foreigners, but not until 1984 was portfolio interest paid to foreigners actually
exempted from tax.
60. Portfolio interest, for purposes of the exemption, is defined in I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(2),
(3). I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) excludes from the definition of portfolio interest any interest paid by
a corporation or partnership to a person who owns 10% or more of the voting shares of the
corporation or of the capital or profits interest in the partnership.
61. A "finance subsidiary" is a wholly-owned corporation, organized for the purpose of
soliciting funds which are lent out to further the business of the parent corporation. The
parent corporation is usually not liable for the obligations of the subsidiary. The two organi-
zations may have different bond or credit ratings on their respective debt.
62. The Netherlands Antilles is an autonomous member of the Netherlands Kingdom
since the enactment of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1954. A.
GASTMANN, THE POLITICS OF SURINAME AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1 (1968). See gener-
ally Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 263, Business Operations in the Netherlands Antilles (1988).
63. The Euro-currency market is the international market for the borrowing and lend-
ing of foreign currencies, of which the U.S. dollar is the most important. Euro-bonds are
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parent. The parent would obtain a deduction for interest"' paid to
the finance subsidiary, but the interest payments made by the U.S.
parent to its finance subsidiary would be exempt 65 from U.S. with-
holding taxation under the terms of the treaty between the
Netherlands and the United States, as extended to the Nether-
lands Antilles. The finance subsidiary would be subject to tax on
interest income in the Netherlands Antilles only to the extent of
the spread between the interest paid and interest received, which
commonly is approximately one percentage point. Interest pay-
ments made by the finance subsidiary to bond holders would be
exempt from taxation in both the United States and the Nether-
lands Antilles. Moreover, subject to certain limitations, the income
tax paid to the Netherlands Antilles could be used to offset, dollar
for dollar, the U.S. parent's U.S. income tax liability via the for-
eign tax credit.6
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 repealed 67 the thirty percent tax
on interest paid to foreigners for portfolio obligations issued after
the repeal's July 18, 1984 enactment." Repeal of that withholding
dollar denominated debt instruments available on the Euro-currency market. For a discus-
sion of the Euro-currency market, see generally R. JOHNSTON, THE ECONOMICS OF THE EURO-
MARKET: HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY (1982) and D. KANE, THE EURODOLLAR MARKET AND
THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1983).
64. I.R.C. § 163.
65. Interest paid to a Netherlands Antilles corporation is exempt from United States
withholding if certain formal status requirements are met and if the requirements of the
treaty withholding regulations are met. 26 C.F.R. 505, 302-05. See Rev. Proc. 79-40, 1979-2
C.B. 504.
66. For a description of the typical structure of a U.S. parent-Netherland Antilles sub-
sidiary transaction, see Granwell, supra note 54, at 306-07.
67. For an explanation of the repeal of the 30% withholding tax on portfolio interest
paid to foreign persons, see Tax Reform Act of 1984, 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 387,
387-98 (1985) (report prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation; includes
reproduction of the text of the General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1984) [hereinafter General Explanation 1984].
68. Several justifications can be given for the repeal of 30% withholding tax on portfo-
lio interest. The repeal increased tax equity and the efficiency of international transactions
by extending to all borrowers and lenders the tax treatment that had previously been availa-
ble only to those able (perhaps because of size) to take advantage of the type of "treaty
shopping" manipulation described above. It was deemed inadvisable simply to attempt to
close the treaty shopping loophole, because to do so would place U.S. borrowers at a disad-
vantage in Eurodollar markets, as lenders commonly insisted upon a return high enough to
compensate for the U.S. withholding tax.
There was also some concern that sudden abrogation of the treaty with the Netherlands
Antilles would cause severe economic dislocation in that country. See Granwell, supra note
54, at 309-10. For evidence that the pre-1975 Canadian withholding tax on portfolio interest
paid to foreigners increased interest costs of Canadian corporations, see generally Brean,
International Portfolio Capital: The Wedge of the Withholding Tax, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 239
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tax increased the attractiveness of U.S. investments for those tax-
payers from countries with mobile capital."9
The repeal of the thirty percent withholding tax makes this
problem largely academic, except with respect to interest on ex-
isting debt. While repeal of the Netherlands Antilles treaty will
eliminate the most egregious opportunity for treaty shopping, it
will not totally eliminate the problem posed by third-country use
of treaties, especially for non-interest payments.
D. Other Portfolio Income
Capital gains on assets other than real estate realized by for-
eign persons generally are exempt from U.S. tax. Such gains are
subject to taxation only if they are effectively connected with a
U.S. trade or business, 70 or, when realized by an individual, if the
owner was in the United States for more than 182 days during the
year of disposition. 1
(1984). Because of its greater size one might expect effects in the United States to be some-
what less pronounced, but still important.
69. The following is a particularly biting before-the-fact assessment of this strategy:
[I]t belittles the United States to prey on other residence countries. Unilateral
exemption without insistence on the recipient's identifying himself curries funds
from those violating currency controls ... , criminals, and garden variety tax
evaders. . . . The idea of the United States - the ultimate residence country,
the repository of tax morality and information reporting, the critic of tax havens
- obtaining lower interest costs for its residents in this fashion does not com-
port with any overall United States idea of how the international tax system
should operate. In any event, there is little advantage to be gained by doing so.
A 1978 submission to the Treasury asserted that the Eurodollar interest saving
then amounted to less than one-fourth of 1%: a tax system's integrity should
bring more than that.
Kingson, supra note 15, at 1286-87. As argued below, this policy also allows the United
States to prey on countries with source-based tax systems.
The U.S. government announced on June 29, 1987 the termination of its tax treaty with
the Netherlands Antilles, effective January 1, 1988. The termination announcement was mo-
tivated by "wrangling over certain aspects of the exchange of information clause .... "
United Nations and Netherlands (On Behalf of Netherlands Antilles), in 21 INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL NATIONS at 361 (W. Diamond & D. Diamond series B eds.
1988) (introductory note preceding Treaty). However, outcry from world financial markets
persuaded the U.S. to retain the exemption for bonds, but to revoke the rest of the treaty.
Fears that termination of the treaty might apply to interest on bonds issued before the 1984
repeal of 30% withholding caused a furor in Eurodollar markets, because it would trigger
provisions under which high yield bonds could be called to take advantage of lower interest
rates. Id.
70. See I.R.C. § 882(a) (tax on income of foreign corporations connected with United
States business).
71. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) (capital gains of aliens present in the United States 183 days
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Dividends, royalties, and other forms of portfolio income paid
to foreigners are subject to a thirty percent withholding tax, except
as reduced by treaties. 7' As with interest income under pre-1984
law, residents of nations without a treaty with the United States
(as well as U.S. citizens) can channel funds through treaty coun-
tries in order to benefit from the reduced withholding rates.
Abuse of the treaty mechanism is accomplished in a relatively
straightforward manner. The recipient of U.S.-source dividends
provides an address in a treaty country to the payor of dividends.
Unless the withholding agent knows that the dividends recipient is
not a resident of the treaty country, it may reduce withholding
rates to those specified by treaty. Though slightly different, the
withholding requirements for non-dividend income are equally lax;
it is a simple matter to obtain reduced withholding rates by certi-
fying residence in a treaty country. Since U.S. regulations do not
require that payors of portfolio income determine the identity and
residence of the beneficial owners of nominee accounts, such ac-
counts held in treaty countries can be used to evade U.S. withhold-
ing tax on such income."
or more).
72. In principle, the United States disallows treaty rates if the treaty partner imposes
discriminatorily low rates on income from foreign sources. But this measure is largely inef-
fective if the treaty partner has a low rate that is generally applicable or if it allows bloated
deductions that reduce the tax base to such an extent that application of a high rate results
in a low effective rate of tax. Little was gained when, in 1963, the United States decided to
disallow benefits of the Netherlands Antilles treaty for investment companies opting to be
taxed at one-tenth the normal Netherlands Antilles tax rate (three percent instead of 30
percent). It was a simple matter to replicate the effects of a three percent tax rate and 100%
equity financing of such companies with a debt-equity ratio of nine-to-one and a 30% tax
rate. Although Netherlands Antilles law did not allow a deduction for interest paid to for-
eign shareholders, it was a simple matter to turn non-deductible interest into deductible
interest by using a back-to-back transaction in which shareholders deposit funds in an inter-
est-bearing account with an independent bank, which then re-lends the funds to the invest-
ment company. It is worth noting that this 1963 modification of the United States-Nether-
lands Antilles treaty was "prompted in part by complaints from Latin American and other
countries that the United States was using the convention to attract the investment of flight
capital .. " Kingson, supra note 14, at 1279.
73. It is instructive to quote at length from a 1980 article that uses the following exam-
ple of the use of treaty shopping by a resident of Venezuela, which, at the time, employed
the territorial system of taxation:
Assume that Juan Sanchez, a resident of Venezuela, buys a portfolio of $1 mil-
lion worth of U.S. shares. Venezuela, like some two-thirds of all Latin American
countries, taxes its residents only on a territorial basis. It imposes no tax on
foreign-source income. Thus, Sanchez pays no Venezuelan taxes on his dividends
or capital gains from U.S. shares. Venezuela gives Sanchez no foreign tax credit
or other relief for taxes he pays abroad so he is anxious to pay the least possible
amount of total taxes to other countries.
1989] CAPITAL FLIGHT 339
E. Capital Gains on Real Property
Before passage of the Foreign Investment in Real Property
Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA), 4 a foreign investor could easily invest
in real property in the United States and incur no U.S. tax liability
on gains realized on disposition of the property.75 A simple way to
achieve this result would be to hold the real property through a
U.S. or foreign corporation and then sell the corporation's stock.76
FIRPTA changes this situation dramatically. FIRPTA im-
posed a tax on gains realized after June 18, 1980 by a foreign per-
son from the disposition of a "United States real property inter-
est" (USRPI). All gains and losses from dispositions of USRPIs
were reclassified 77 as being effectively connected with a U.S. trade
If he invests in the United States directly - using no intervening invest-
ment company - he would pay 30 percent U.S. withholdingtax on the divi-
dends. His capital gains would be tax-free under domestic U.S. tax law. Suppose,
however, that he interposed an intervening Netherlands Antilles investment
company. Under the treaty, it would pay 15 percent U.S. withholding tax instead
of the statutory 30 percent rate. . . . [hie is subject to 15 percent Antilles tax on
the dividend, but it has remained comparatively easy to reduce the combined
effective rate to between 20 and 25 percent, since the Antilles tax is imposed on
net rather than gross income....
The Sanchez fact pattern is clearly an example of treaty shopping. Sanchez
is a resident of Venezuela which has no income tax treaty with the United
States; he is not a resident of the Netherlands Antilles. Nevertheless, he has
established his investment company in the Antilles for the purpose of using -
or abusing - the income tax treaty between the Antilles and the United States.
Langer, Tax Treaties Creating Tax Haven Situations, 11 TAX NOTEs 667, 667-69 (1980).
In theory, foreign countries with which the United States has treaties could require that
nominees subject to their jurisdiction withhold U.S. taxes in the case of accounts held for
non-residents, as required, for example, by the United States treaty with Switzerland. In
fact, it is reported that only Belgium and Switzerland are effective in doing so, and they are
said to consider it to be "a costly accommodation to the United States." See Karzon, supra
note 59, at 771-73.
74. Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 1121-
1125, 94 Stat. 2682-2690 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 861, 871, 882, 897, 6039C, 6652).
75. For a discussion of FIRPTA's legislative background, see Feder & Parker, The For-
eign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, 34 TAx LAw. 545, 547-48 (1981).
76. The new owner of the corporation ordinarily could liquidate the corporation with-
out tax liability. Alternatively, the corporation could sell the property and then be liqui-
dated. No tax would be due on the gain realized by the corporation if a plan of liquidation
were adopted before the sale and implemented within one year. The gain realized by the
shareholders upon liquidation generally would be subject to tax only under the conditions
stated in the text accompanying this note. Tax on capital gains on real estate can still be
avoided (or at least postponed) if the real estate is owned by a foreign corporation whose
ownership changes. For an excellent analysis of FIRPTA, upon which much of this discus-
sion is based, see id. The present discussion provides only a broad outline of FIRPTA, a law
which is "complex and replete with ambiguities." Id. at 546.
77. FIRPTA does not change, however, the basic rule that mere ownership of U.S. real
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or business. 8 Thus, FIRPTA supplants foreign tax treaties that al-
low the taxpayer the annual election of whether gains and losses
are to be deemed to be from a trade or business"9 or are to be
presumed to be derived from passive investments.
United States real property interests include fee simple owner-
ship of property, leaseholds, and options to acquire property inter-
ests.80 A foreign person's interest in a U.S. corporation, half of
whose assets are U.S. property, (i.e., a U.S. real property holding
corporation, or USRPHC) is also a USRPI. sl Real property is de-
fined broadly under FIRPTA, and includes interests in cooperative
apartments, residential dwellings, plants and factories, rental prop-
erty and hotels, and interests in mineral, timber, and oil and gas
properties."2
The passage of FIRPTA was motivated by concern that for-
eign investors responding to tax incentives unavailable to U.S. tax
citizens were bidding up the price of American farm land.8 3 As
originally passed, FIRPTA imposed extensive reporting require-
property does not cause a foreign person to be engaged in U.S. trade or business, in the
absence of active management or the exercise of an option to be treated as engaged in a
trade or business.
78. Because the income taxed under FIRPTA is deemed to be from U.S. sources, it
cannot be offset by taxes paid to foreign countries through foreign tax credits.
79. Foreign investors had the option of electing to have real estate activities taxed as a
trade or business to avoid tax on gross income (at a rate of 30%, unless reduced by treaty).
This election had the disadvantage that capital gains on diposition of real estate would be
subject to tax. Most pre-1980 U.S. foreign tax treaties modify this election to make it availa-
ble on a year-by-year basis. Thus, residents of countries with which the U.S. has such trea-
ties could make a selective election, choosing trade or business status for operating income
and yet pay no tax on capital gains. These treaties were subject to abuse by non-residents of
treaty nations. See Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-Owned
Real Estate, 71 GEo. L.J. 1091, 1109-10 (1983).
80. I.R.C. § 897(c)(6)(A).
81. I.R.C. § 897(c)(2). There are two important exceptions to this rule. The first is for
stock regularly traded on an established securities market in which the investor holds five
percent or less of the corporation's stock. I.R.C. § 897(c)(3). The second exception applies if
the corporation was not a USRPHC during the time the foreign investor held its stock.
I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I). For purposes of applying these tests, FIRPTA provides "an im-
pressive battery of 'look-through' provisions. . . . The statute's point seems clear: formali-
ties of title holding are irrelevant, whether they involve foreign or domestic corporations,
partnerships, or other conduits. A company's status as a 'United States real property hold-
ing corporation' is a function of its substantive asset ownership and nothing else." Kaplan,
supra note 79, at 1106-07.
82. See I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(i) (United States real property interests); I.R.C. § 897
(c)(6)(B) (real property includes associated personal property). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.897-
1.
83. For a discussion of the concerns that motivated passage of FIRPTA, see Kaplan,
supra, note 79, at 1092-95.
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ments84 on U.S. nonpublic corporations, partnerships, trusts, and
estates which had a foreign investor whose pro-rata s6 share of the
entity's USRPI exceeded $50,000.86 In addition, reporting require-
ments applied to any foreign person not engaged in a trade or busi-
ness in the United States which owned a USRPI of more than
$50,000 in value and was not otherwise required to file an informa-
tion return. Alternatively, a security deposit for the payment of
federal income taxes could be furnished in lieu of filing certain of
the information reports.8 7 The extremely complex, ambiguous, and
intrusive reporting requirements were strongly resisted. Many for-
eign persons and U.S. entities through which foreign persons hold
USRPIs, were unwilling or unable to comply with the reporting or
security requirements. In response, the Tax Reform Act of 1984
substituted a system of withholding8 for the reporting require-
ments and security deposits. In general, the transferee of a USRPI
is required to withhold ten percent of the amount realized from
the disposition of a USRPI.as Under certain circumstances,'0 the
withholding requirements are placed on corporations, partnerships,
and trusts. In addition, a foreign corporation that distributes a
USRPI to its shareholders (whether foreign or domestic) in a
transaction in which gain is taxable under FIRPTA must withhold
thirty-four percent of such gain.a" These obligations can be avoided
if the transferor of the USRPI certifies that it 2 is not a foreign
person and provides a U.S. taxpayer identification number.' 3
84. See I.R.C. § 6039C (returns with respect to foreign persons holding real property
interests).
85. See I.R.C. § 6039C(c)(3)(A).
86. See I.R.C. § 6039C(b)(2).
87. See further Norman, Tax Aspects of Foreign Investment in US Real Estate, IN'r'L
Bus. LAW. 213 (May 1985).
88. See General Explanation 1984, supra note 67, at 406-15.
89. The transferee owes the transferor of the property the purchase price. If, for exam-
ple, the withholding rate is ten percent and the transferee owes $1000 (purchase price), $900
will be remitted to the transferor and $100 (ten percent) will be remitted directly to the
I.R.S. as "amount withheld." The burden of withholding is placed on the transferee on the
presumption that he will honestly report to the I.R.S.; the transferee will not lose money as
a result of the withholding.
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1445-1 (withholding on dispositions of U.S. real property inter-
ests by foreign persons).
91. See I.R.C. § 1445(e)(1) (special rules relating to distributions by corporations, part-
nerships, trusts, or estates).
92. See I.R.C. § 1445(b)(2) (transferor furnishes non-foreign affidavit).
93. Such a requirement for certification by the transferor places the burden of proof on
the transferor and removes the necessity for transferees in ordinary real estate transactions
(most of which are between Americans) to know the identity of the ultimate owners of bene-
ficial interests in USRPIs transferred to them. For a negative assessment of the use of both
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There has been some concern that FIRPTA might have less
impact than expected. Regulations indicate that the 1984 tax act
effectively repealed withholding tax on interest payments on cer-
tain private placements, as well as on portfolio investments in pub-
licly traded securities. It has been unclear whether under FIRPTA
it would be possible to structure a creditor's interest in real estate
with a strong element of equity participation in such a way that it
would not constitute a USRPI. If this is possible, investments with
the economic features of equity participations but the legal fea-
tures of debt could be used to circumvent the goals of FIRPTA. If
a foreign creditor were given fixed interest bonds with additional
payments contingent on appreciation of property, a USRPI almost
certainly would be found to exist. Actual transactions generally
would be much more complicated than this, so that the economic
nature of the matter would be less transparent.
The tax treatment of debt with contingent interest" "equity
kickers ' 95 based on net operating profits, appreciation of property,
or gain on the sale of property is somewhat less certain. The U.S.
Treasury Department has, however, warned taxpayers that it will
interpret debt with equity kickers as a USRPI subject to FIRPTA.
Another potential gap in the FIRPTA provisions results from the
fact that it may be possible to structure ownership arrangements
in such a way as to avoid a taxable disposition under U.S. tax law.
For example, a USRPI might be held by a foreign corporation
whose ownership could change without triggering U.S. taxation
under FIRPTA. Even though a foreign corporation can be charac-
terized as a real property holding company, disposition of its stock
by a foreign person is not subject to U.S. tax under FIRPTA. Of
course, this is likely to be a quite clumsy investment vehicle, par-
ticularly since the buyer assumes the corporation's "tax history" in
such a case.9 It can be assumed, moreover, that the purchaser of
stock in such a corporation would reduce the price paid for such
stock to reflect the tax that must be paid upon liquidation. As the
buyer (through the corporation) retains the seller's basis in the real
property, tax can be deferred indefinitely, but it cannot be avoided
information reporting and withholding to implement FIRPTA, see Kaplan, supra note 79,
at 1114-20.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.897-1(d)(3)(ii)(B).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.897-1(d)(2)(i) (direct or indirect share in the appreciation in value).
96. For example, the transferee would assume the transferor's basis, holding period, net
operating loss carry forwards, investment credit carry forwards against future tax liability,
and all other tax attributes.
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completely. On balance, the most appropriate conclusion seems to
be that the taxation of capital gains on U.S. real estate realized by
foreigners has been tightened substantially, although some gains
may escape taxation or tax may be deferred for long periods.
F. Summary Assessment
U.S. taxation of income earned by foreigners appears to have
evolved in recent years. Portfolio interest, like interest paid by fi-
nancial institutions, now enjoys exemption from withholding tax.
To a large extent, this simply codified the practice of many large
corporations, namely, establishing Netherlands Antilles financing
subsidiaries to circumvent previously existing withholding
requirements.9 7
Other forms of portfolio income received by foreigners remain
subject to withholding tax, but these taxes can be reduced substan-
tially by channeling investments through countries with which the
United States has tax treaties. Residents of non-treaty countries,
as well as U.S. residents, can use these techniques to avoid U.S.
withholding taxes on payments to residents of non-treaty nations.98
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Faced with the situation just described, Latin American coun-
tries concerned about the possibility that generous tax treatment
in the United States may induce capital flight have three basic op-
tions. This section examines these options. It concludes that pros-
pects are not bright under any of the three approaches.
First, the country can attempt to adapt to the international
tax environment in order to minimize the damage to its economy.
This would imply adoption of the worldwide principle and negotia-
tion of foreign tax treaties with the United States; presumably,
97. It is worth noting, however, that this problem was attacked by exempting portfolio
interest, rather than by simply abrogating the Netherlands Antilles treaty. This was because
of the express desire to avoid putting American borrowers at a disadvantage relative to their
foreign competitors, who are said to have ready access to financial markets abroad without
the requirement to pay withholding taxes.
98. It is not surprising that in 1978 almost 90% of investment income sent from the
United States to foreign countries flowed to countries having tax treaties with the United
States. Even more telling is the fact that approximately one-half of dividends and one-third
of non-bank interest paid to foreign addressees (at that time still subject to withholding tax)
went to only three countries (Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Netherlands Antilles),
nations that are notorious for being used by those interested in "treaty shopping."
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such treaties must contain exchange of information agreements if
they are to be effective. This approach seems to offer little
promise.
Second, the country can attempt to change the external envi-
ronment by persuading the United States and other developed
countries to alter their tax treatment of income earned by foreign-
ers. In essence, this means convincing the United States and other
developed countries to reverse their long-standing preference for
residence-based taxation - or at least to apply source-based taxa-
tion to income originating within their jurisdictions in order to
avoid attracting funds from Latin America. The outlook for this
strategy also is not bright.
A third and far more extreme option would be to adopt a fun-
damentally different system of direct taxation that exempts capital
income from domestic investment. Such an approach would place
domestic-source income from business and capital on even terms
with income from foreign investment. While worthy of further con-
sideration, this approach has certain obvious problems.
A. Switch to Residence Principle
Perhaps the problem of tax-induced capital flight could be
eliminated if Latin American countries relying on a territorial-
based tax system instead were to adopt a system based on the
worldwide taxation of their residents. However, without exchange
of information agreements, merely requiring that residents pay tax
on worldwide income would raise little revenue, except from those
who comply with tax laws as a matter of moral principle. More
rigorous tax administration also is unlikely to have a major effect
in inducing compliance with the tax law, because the receipt of for-
eign-source income is extremely difficult to detect. Little possibil-
ity exists that tax could be collected on capital income earned in
the United States by residents of Latin American countries.
Exchange of information agreements, although not a panacea,
would complement a comprehensive tax treaty with the United
States. Pursuit of such agreements, however, may not fulfill the
goals of many Latin American countries. The United States can be
expected to require low withholding rates on interest and divi-
dends as a condition to any such treaty. The revenue loss that




In fact, exchange of information agreements are useful only
when the Latin American investor accurately reports his or her
name and address to the U.S. payor. False information provided to
the payor enables the taxpayer to circumvent monitoring by fiscal
authorities. To prevent this form of abuse, it would be necessary
for the United States and the home country of the investor to de-
tect the existence of addresses of convenience in countries impos-
ing no tax on such income. In order to understand the difficulty of
relying on exchange of information agreements to assist Latin
American countries in the implementation of worldwide taxation
of the income of their residents, it is instructive to contemplate the
opportunities for tax evasion on U.S.-source income that are open
even to residents of the United States; these opportunities are cre-
ated by the combination of liberal U.S. treatment of income osten-
sibly paid to foreigners and lax administrative procedures."
Even before passage of the 1984 legislation that eliminated
withholding tax on portfolio interest paid to foreigners, the follow-
ing assessment was made of the ease with which U.S. residents
could evade tax on interest received from domestic financial
institutions:
Evidence is mounting that some United States residents are
posing as foreign persons, establishing interest-bearing savings
and checking accounts at United States banks and savings and
loan institutions, directing that the interest income be sent to
them at an address of convenience in a foreign country, and
omitting that interest as income on their United States tax
returns.10
The cause of this growing source of evasion is not difficult to
identify.
The scheme appears to succeed only because many barriers im-
pede tax officials from detecting the transaction. At the United
States end of the transaction, the financial institution paying
the bank interest is not required to withhold tax or report the
transaction .... [A] survey of the practices of representative
banking institutions has indicated that many payors rely solely
upon the foreign address submitted by the depositor and have
little or no internal safeguards to verify a depositor's true
99. For an excellent review of difficulties in this area, see Karzon, supra note 59, at 764-
100. Id. at 764-65.
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residency.'0 '
One can only assume that similar abuses will result from the ex-
emption of portfolio interest paid to foreigners, despite the safe-
guards contained in the 1984 law.0 2
The implications for Latin American countries wishing to tax
worldwide income of their residents is discouraging. If the United
States devotes little effort to prevent this type of evasion by its
own residents, there is little reason to expect U.S. assistance to
Latin American countries seeking to prevent evasion of worldwide
taxes by their residents. United States fiscal authorities are un-
likely to do for other countries what they cannot or will not do for
the United States.
Aggravating the problem just described is the increased oppor-
tunity for secrecy being provided by certain countries as part of an
attempt to attract intermediation of international capital move-
ments.103 "[S]ecrecy laws conceal the transaction and the identity
101. Id. at 765-66.
102. In order to prevent U.S. persons from taking advantage of the repeal of the 30%
withholding tax, the law provides certain safeguards. First, the exemption is available for
registered debt only if the beneficial owner of the obligation is not a U.S person. A state-
ment to this effect can be provided the U.S. payor of interest by either the beneficial owner
or specified types of financial institutions. Bearer debt (obligations that are not registered,
and therefore are payable to whoever has possession of the instrument) can be issued with-
out withholding, provided the following requirements intended to target such debt to for-
eign investors are satisfied: (a) the obligations must be sold under procedures reasonably
designed to prevent sales to U.S. persons; (b) interest must be payable only outside the
United States; and (c) the obligations must state that U.S. holders are subject to U.S. in-
come tax on interest on such obligations. Granwell, supra note 54, at 309, notes that "where
the ultimate recipient of the interest is unknown, withholding will be required where the
payor does not know the identity of the beneficial owner of the securities." Moreover, he
notes that "regulations presently in place .. require withholding in such circumstances."
Id.
Under certain circumstances interest paid to foreigners will not be exempt from the
30% tax. Interest is not exempt if paid to someone owning 10% or more of the voting stock
of a corporate payor or 10% or more of the capital or profit interest in a partnership payor,
or if the interest is paid to a bank under a loan agreement entered into in the ordinary
course of its business (except for interest of the U.S. government). Interest income effec-
tively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business also is not exempt from tax.
See id.
103. The following procedural factors contribute to the use of foreign addresses to
evade taxes:
(1) insufficient mechanisms to verify that a particular recipient is a qualified
foreign resident at the claimed address; (2) the lack of any official procedure to
penetrate a foreign nominee account and determine the identities and addresses
of its beneficial owners; (3) the grant of authority to nongovernmental bodies -
the withholding agents - to determine and dispense massive tax reductions by
reducing tax withheld at the source; and (4) the conceded inability of the gov-
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of the taxpayer, and block United States authorities from gaining
the information necessary to trace and prove the fraud."'"' The
same problems that confront the United States would similarly im-
pede Latin American countries attempting to implement a world-
wide taxation system. 10 5
Before the 1984 law exempting portfolio interest was passed,
Americans and foreigners could use nominee accounts in countries
with which the United States had a favorable tax treaty to evade
withholding taxes on interest and dividends from portfolio income.
While the interest exemption renders this machination unneces-
sary, the practice may persist as a means by which to avoid taxa-
tion on other forms of portfolio income. Cooperation between the
United States and a Latin American country, without the help of
the U.S. treaty partner in which the nominee account is estab-
lished, is unlikely to reduce this problem significantly. Moreover,
reliance on U.S. treaty partners is apt to be futile.'0 While there is
ernment to oversee the withholding system effectively and in a timely manner.
The foreign component that permits the schemes to flourish unchecked is the
alarming phenomenon of increasingly strict secrecy laws in a multiplicity of
foreign jurisdictions.
Karzon, supra note 59, at 779 (emphasis supplied).
104. Id. For a detailed discussion of how foreign secrecy laws in Switzerland, the
Netherlands, the Bahamas, and Panama impede detection of abuse of the foreign address
system of determining eligibility for exemption from withholding, see id. at 778-801.
In the extreme case, a foreign investor interested in anonymity may use a two-stage
structure consisting of an account with a Bahamian bank, which then opens an inter-bank
deposit with a bank in Panama. "[S]ecrecy is enforced in both jurisdictions and beneficial
ownership is unknown in each jurisdiction." Id. at 800.
105. Professor Karzon postulates that:
[a]s long as one haven is in existence, capital seeking secrecy will migrate to it
with the speed of electronic transfer, and the present enforcement dilemma will
remain substantially unresolved. The current preoccupation with bank secrecy
legislation, moreover, obscures a more fundamental economic fact: almost all
countries offer anonymity to those investors who take advantage of the nominee
structure to use banks or brokerage houses to hold portfolio investments or who
establish unsupervised corporations to issue bearer shares. Each of these legal
structures, which are ubiquitous as well as respectable in developed countries,
can conceal effectively the identity of an investment's true owner. It is unrealis-
tic to expect and egocentric to believe that the United States could, or should,
compel all other countries to alter their internal tax, corporate, banking, and
commercial laws, at the expense of their nationalistic self-interests, in order to
facilitate United States tax collections.
Id. at 827.
It seems even less likely that accommodation would be made to Latin American
countries.
106. In a slightly different context, this appraisal was given: "'the residence basis taxa-
tion policy of the treaty places the United States in the position of relying on our treaty
partners to prevent abuse of our tax system - a particularly risky proposition in the case of
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a United States interest in persuading its treaty partners to pro-
hibit a U.S. resident's use of a nominee account to evade U.S.
taxes, no similar interest is present for the U.S. or a treaty partner
to prevent abuses by residents of third countries.' It seems un-
likely that the United States will expend political capital to con-
vince its treaty partners to protect fiscal resources of Latin Ameri-
can countries.
Latin American tax authorities might ponder the practical
wisdom of residence-based taxation. Conceivably, a switch in sys-
tems designed to generate revenue could result in a complete and
permanent flight from the national economy. If a Latin American
country were to implement, albeit unsuccessfully, taxation on a
worldwide basis, repatriation of foreign source income might be
avoided entirely. Taxpayers repatriating funds from abroad would
face several questions: whether the repatriation represented a sim-
ple return of capital from abroad or taxable income; whether tax
had been paid on income earned abroad in previous years; and, if
such foreign source income were subsequently reinvested abroad,
whether it would earn taxable income. A risk-averse taxpayer
might decide against any repatriation.
B. Changing the International Tax Environment
Rather than implement residence-based taxation, Latin Amer-
ican countries might try again to convince the United States and
other developed countries to increase their source-based taxes. Al-
legiance to the residence principle may be the cause of the increase
in tax evasion by U.S. citizens using the types of ruses described
above.
Responsibility for the burgeoning tax evasion by United
States residents does not lie solely on the doorsteps of the many
nations accused of being tax or secrecy havens. The fault also
lies in the historical United States insistence on a treaty policy
which fosters international tax evasion by favoring residency
basis taxation over source basis taxation for portfolio
treaties with tax havens.'" Id. at 829 n.293 (quoting Hearings on Income Tax Treaties
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980) (statement of David Brockway)).
107. It is possible, however, that the indirect benefits to the United States resulting in
the fiscal solvency of Latin American countries, derived in part through increased collection





The tilt in treaty policy from source-based to residency-
based taxation of portfolio income has widened the opening for
tax evasion. It is most difficult for a residence country, such as
the United States, to detect all portfolio income earned abroad
by the United States residents and all United States-sourced
portfolio income and bank interest received abroad by United
States residents masquerading as foreigners with false foreign
addresses ...
The treaty policy orientation toward residency country tax-
ation of portfolio income should be reappraised, and a return to
source country taxation should be reconsidered ...
The merit of source country taxation lies in its simplicity of
administration and certainty of tax collection ...
In view of the sizeable amount of United States-owned, for-
eign-sourced portfolio income, this shift might enhance rapport
with developing countries, long advocates of source taxation.'
If the United States actually implemented the source principle
that ostensibly underlies its tax treatment of income earned in the
United States by foreigners, the problems described in this paper
would diminish in significance. However, they would not be elimi-
nated as long as other developed countries continued generous
treatment of such income. There is not much reason to be optimis-
tic that this suggested approach will come to fruition.
Current U.S. practice in this area seems to reflect certain
objectives. Income from a U.S. trade or business operated by a for-
eign person is taxed in full, in order to avoid conferring a competi-
tive advantage over U.S. persons. Gains on the sale of real estate
are now considered to be derived from a trade or business, and
thus are subject to tax. This reflects the desire to equalize the tax
treatment of U.S. and foreign investors in real estate, and redo
what were seen to be inappropriate incentives for foreign invest-
ment in U.S. real estate.
By comparison, interest from bank accounts and interest
earned on portfolio investments is exempt from U.S. taxation if it
is not "effectively" connected with a U.S. trade or business. These
exemptions (which are inconsistent with source-based taxation of
income originating in the United States) are provided in part to
attract foreign capital to the United States and in part to avoid a
108. Karzon, supra note 59, at 827-31. (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
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competitive disadvantage for American financial institutions in re-
lation to their counterparts in other developed countries. Contrary
to the situation regarding income from a trade or business and
capital gains on real estate, there is no offsetting concern that for-
eigners have an unfair competitive advantage over Americans be-
cause of more favorable tax treatment. Dividends (and other forms
of "fixed or determinable or periodical" income) remain subject to
withholding, but this tax can be reduced by routing investment
funds through a treaty partner of the United States.
Given the recent repeal of the thirty percent withholding tax
on portfolio interest, and the explicit expression of the sentiments
described previously as a reason for that legislation, it seems highly
unlikely that the United States soon will reverse this policy. It is,
moreover, unlikely that the United States will change its policy if
other developed countries do not follow suit. American opponents
of a scheme which taxes interest income earned by foreigners point
to the continued availability of debt instruments in Europe on
which there is no withholding tax, as justification for continuation
of the exemption. Finally, as long as such instruments remain
available in other countries, taxation of interest by the United
States will not be totally effective in solving the problem of tax-
induced capital flight from Latin America.
The strongest impetus for a change of this type in the United
States is likely to be convincing evidence that Americans are evad-
ing substantial amounts of U.S. income tax by such illegal means
as channelling investments through foreign nominee accounts and
buying bonds of American issuers targeted to foreign lenders. Al-
though there is good reason to believe both that abuses of this type
existed before the repeal of the thirty percent withholding on port-
folio interest and that they have been aggravated by the repeal,
there presently does not seem to be much sentiment in Congress to
attempt to do anything about the problem. Further impetus could
come from the need for deficit reduction; additional federal reve-
nues could be raised by curtailing the exemption of interest going
to foreign addresses.
Even if the United States could be convinced to tax interest
income earned by foreigners, the problem examined in this paper
probably would not be eliminated, as long as reduced rates are ap-
plied to interest earned by residents of countries with which the
United States has tax treaties. As indicated earlier, funds of Latin
American investors could be channelled through selected "tax ha-
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yen" treaty countries in order to benefit from such reduced with-
holding rates. This gimmick would presumably be available on
both interest and dividends (and on any payment for which re-
duced withholding taxes are provided by treaty). It seems quite
unlikely that the developed countries of the world, traditionally
advocates of residence-based taxation, will reverse the historical
trend of using treaties to reduce source-country taxation of these
income flows, especially if the primary justification is to assist the
developing countries in avoiding capital flight.109
C. A More Radical Approach
The discussion to this point has been conducted in the context
of a traditional income tax. In such a system, interest is a deducti-
ble expense and interest income is subject to tax, unless it is ex-
plicitly exempted, as in the case of foreign-source income earned
by residents of a country with a territorial system. As indicated
above, there seems to be little reason for optimism that tax-in-
duced incentives for capital flight from Latin America will be re-
duced in such an income-based tax system. It is possible, however,
that a more extreme reform offers somewhat more hope. The re-
mainder of this section examines this possibility.
An alternative to the traditional income tax that has gained
favor among some academic observers provides tax treatment for
interest and dividends that is very different from that under the
income tax laws of most countries.1 0 In particular, no deduction is
allowed for interest expense, and interest income is not subject to
tax. Additionally, dividends are not taxable in the hands of the
recipient, and, as in most countries, they are not a deductible ex-
pense. Thus, interest and dividends are placed on equal footing
from a tax point of view, thereby eliminating the bias against eq-
109. Developed countries might be somewhat more sympathetic to an appeal from
lesser developed countries based on the need for assistance in implementing their income
taxes. Of course, such an appeal has little force as long as the developing countries continue
to employ the territorial principle.
110. See, e.g., S. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986) (an exposition on the
proposal that interest be non-deductible and exempt from tax). See also R. HALL & A.
RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1985). For thorough examinations of this approach to direct tax-
ation in a developing country context, see generally G. ZODROW & C. McLuIE, IMPLEMENTING
DIRECT CONSUMPTION TAXES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (World Bank Working Paper No.
WPS 131, Dec. 1988); C. McLURE, J. Murri, V. THURONYI, & G. ZODROW, THE TAXATION OF
INCOME FROM BUSINESS AND CAPITAL IN COLOMBIA (1989) (forthcoming).
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uity finance found in the tax systems of most countries.111 Immedi-
ate deduction is allowed for all business purchases, including those
of capital goods; thus, there is no need for either depreciation al-
lowances or special accounting for inventories.' 12 Consumption,
rather than income, would provide the basis for this tax system.
The extreme simplicity of this alternative should afford it seri-
ous consideration by developing countries. But simplicity is not its
only attractive quality. This approach essentially combats the
problem of capital flight from LDCs created by the tax exemption
of certain income in its country of source by also exempting much
domestic-source income from business and capital."'3
1. LDC Policy
Predicting the full implications of adoption of a system such
as this for the problem of tax-induced capital flight is quite diffi-
cult. If only a single developing country were to adopt the system,
interest and dividends earned on domestic investment would be
exempt and business income would be subject to a zero marginal
effective tax rate; of course, under most income tax systems that
are administered reasonably well (and have adequate provisions
for withholding on interest) this benefit is now generally available
only for income on capital invested abroad (under either the terri-
torial system or an ineffectively administered worldwide system).
This change would appear to reduce the tax incentives for capital
flight. But interest paid by domestic businesses no longer would be
111. For a discussion of these biases and alternative ways to integrate the income taxes,
see C. McLuRE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwICE? (1979).
112. Indeed, all the complex timing issues that plague the income tax are eliminated.
An additional administrative advantage of such a system, not relevant for the present dis-
cussion, is that there is no need for inflation adjustment in the measurement of income from
business and capital, a complex necessity if real income is to be measured accurately.
McLure, Lessons for LDCs of U.S. Income Tax Reform, in TAX REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, at 1347 (M. Gillis ed. 1989).
113. Interest and dividends received by individuals are explicitly exempt. For busi-
nesses, the combination of expensing of purchases and disallowance of interest expense is
equivalent in present value terms to exempting the marginal return to capital. This is easily
seen in the case of equity finance. Suppose that the tax rate is 40% and the interest rate is
10 percent. Because of expensing, an investment of 100 costs the taxpayers only 60 and costs
the government 40. If the asset is fully depreciated in one year and yields a rate of return of
10%, the government takes 44 of the 110 of yield and return of principle, and the taxpayer
keeps 66. The 10% after-tax yield of 6 on the private investment of 60 is the same as if
there were no income tax or if the income were exempt. A similar demonstration can be
provided for debt-financed investment. For further discussion, see G. ZODROW & C. McLURE,
supra note 110; C. McLuRE, J. Murri, V. THURONYI, AND G. ZODROW, supra note 110.
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a deductible expense. Depending on the relation between the mar-
ginal tax rates currently applied to interest income and to the net
income of business, the net effect of such a change might be either
to increase or reduce the total taxation applied to domestic inter-
est flows. Given commonly observed patterns of asset ownership,
marginal tax rates, and evasion of tax on interest income, a small
net increase in the taxation of interest paid by business might be
expected. By comparison, there would be no offset to the exemp-
tion of interest on public debt. Total taxation of domestic-source
dividends would clearly drop, except in cases where substantial re-
lief from double taxation of dividends already exists.
The immediate expensing of all business purchases, including
capital goods and items added to inventory, would further reduce
the taxation of business income from equity investment in most
countries. This would be true especially where neither rapid depre-
ciation (or other generous investment allowances) nor inflation ad-
justment of depreciable basis presently is allowed. The net effect of
these changes would be too country-specific to allow easy general-
ization. For example, some countries might allow such rapid depre-
ciation that expensing would provide little additional benefit. Sim-
ilarly, in a country that adjusts interest expense for inflation, the
total disallowance of deductions for interest expense and the exclu-
sion of interest income from the tax base may be relatively unim-
portant. But movement from full deduction of nominal interest""
to no deduction would be dramatic. Though capital flight might be
either worsened or reduced as the net effect of a change such as
this, a reduction seems most likely for most countries that do not
allow either inflation adjustment of depreciable basis or generous
capital consumption allowances.
The taxation of income from foreign capital invested in the
country also would be affected by a change as far-reaching as this.
As for domestic firms, interest expense would no longer be deducti-
ble, but immediate expensing would be allowed. Net effects would
be very country-specific (or even industry- or firm-specific), but it
appears that taxation commonly would be reduced. Revenues from
foreign investors, however, might be recouped through increased
remittance taxes on interest and dividends.
114. Nominal interest rate is the rate actually charged to the borrower. The real inter-




The reaction of capital exporting countries which provide for-
eign tax credits for source-country taxes on net income adds uncer-
tainty to the prediction. Disallowance of the interest expense raises
the risk that taxes paid by U.S. residents would not be credited
against U.S. income taxes."' Of course, the tax savings of expens-
ing may more than offset the loss of the interest deduction and loss
of the foreign tax credit.""
Disallowance of interest deductions under the tax system pro-
posed is quite different from the failure to allow deductions for
expenses under a gross receipts tax. The interest disallowance is an
integral part of a direct tax system based on consumption, rather
than income. Moreover, it typically may be offset, or more than
offset, by the allowance of expensing of all purchases.11 7 This is
potentially quite important under U.S. law, which provides that a
tax can be creditable even if it does not allow deductions for all
expenses, provided a compensatory benefit of at least equal value
is allowed. On balance, it appears that there is at least some
chance that the tax in question would be creditable, at least in the
United States.1 '
The U.S. foreign tax credit is, in rough terms, limited to the
average U.S. tax rate on foreign-source income. This limit is calcu-
lated on an "overall" (worldwide) basis, rather than on a country-
by-country basis. Foreign taxes exceeding the average U.S. rate re-
sult in "excess foreign tax credits," which may not be applied
against U.S. tax liability. Recent changes in U.S. law, including
rules for the determination of the source of income,""9 as well as
rate reduction, make it more likely than before that U.S. firms will
have excess foreign tax credits. To the extent that this is the case,
115. Under U.S. law, the test of whether a tax is creditable is whether the tax is im-
posed on net income. It appears that treatment more generous than is needed to measure
economic income is acceptable, but that less generous treatment jeopardizes availability of
the credit. The reason is that the United States is unwilling to allow credits for payments to
governments other than income taxes, e.g., royalties and gross receipts taxes. For one specu-
lation about the likely U.S. reaction to adoption of a consumption-based direct tax by an-
other country and the significance of that reaction, see C. McLuRE, J. MuTTi, V. THURONYI, &
G. ZODROW, supra note 110, at ch. 9.
116. But the problem would resurface if higher remittance taxes were used to prevent a
drop in revenue from income on investments from foreigners.
117. This can be seen from the fact that the marginal effective tax rate is zero. See
supra note 113.
118. Creditability of the withholding tax on foreign remittances will most likely depend
on the creditability of the underlying consumption-based tax.
119. See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(f)(1)(i) (overall limitation to the foreign tax credit).
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it may make relatively little practical difference whether the tax
under consideration herein is credited. As long as the firm is in an
excess credit position in the aggregate, additional taxes on foreign
income cannot be credited, even if, in principle, they are
creditable.
2. Advanced Country Policy
Widespread adoption of consumption-based tax by the devel-
oped countries could do much to eliminate the present tax advan-
tages motivating foreigners to invest in such countries. Currently,
firms paying interest to foreigners enjoy a deduction for interest
payments, and the foreign recipient enjoys the exclusion of interest
income; the combined marginal tax rate of payor and payee ap-
plied to such income in the source country is negative.120 Without a
deduction for interest expense, the combined marginal tax rate on
interest remittances would rise to zero. Capital flight promoted by
advantageous tax treatment of debt would thereby be eliminated,
or at least severely reduced.
Perhaps equally as important, abusive use of foreign nominee
accounts, addresses of convenience, and treaty shopping would be
eliminated. Tax, in effect, would be "collected" through the disal-
lowance of interest deductions, rather than by withholding, and
withholding taxes could be eliminated.121
As exciting as a switch to a system of this type may appear, it
clearly does not offer a "quick fix." Its adoption would run counter
to decades of development of the tax on net income. There are also
important concerns about equity and transition that must be ad-
dressed satisfactorily. Moreover, under this approach taxation of
capital income in effect is placed on a source basis, rather than a
residence basis. Thus, the entire system of international conven-
tions dealing with flows of income among nations would need to be
rethought.1 2
120. For present purposes we can assume that such income is not effectively taxed by
the country of residence. The net tax benefit is equal in magnitude to the product of the
interest flow and the tax rate applied to business income.
121. Reference to collecting taxes may appear inappropriate for a system in which the
present value of taxes is zero. But this feature of the consumption-based tax is properly
traced to the tax treatment of depreciable (and similar) assets, and not to the treatment of
interest. For purpose of the comparison with the income tax, the statement accompanying
this note seems appropriate.
122. There may be a reluctance to disallow interest deductions for domestic firms, if
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Developed countries that have fought diligently for residence-
based taxation would need to reverse their stance. Given the
worldwide proclivity to adopt "beggar-thy neighbor" policies, even
by developed countries in their dealings with LDCs, the prospects
for quick action of this type are dim. Revision is likely only if
Latin American countries insist en masse that present interna-
tional tax customs and practices are unsatisfactory. Though the
journey to a new international fiscal order may be long, it may be
worthwhile to begin.
such deductions continue to be allowed to foreign firms by their country of residence, be-
cause to do so would place domestic firms at a distinct disadvantage in takeover campaigns.
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Foreign Tax Credit: * signifies that neither credit nor deduction is al-
lowed or appropriate, since the country uses the territorial principle;
thus "yes" or "no" is relevant only for countries using the worldwide
principle.
Treaty participation: numbers indicate how many treaties are in effect.
"Andean" indicates that the country has agreed to the provision that
income flowing between two signatories will be subject to taxation
only in the source country.
Source: Corporate Taxation in Latin America (Amsterdam: International Bureau
for Fiscal Documentation, various dates, 1985-86).
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